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PESTICIDE USE AND LIABILITY IN
NORTH DAKOTA
The danger of pesticide poisoning to man and domestic animals
has become a real concern only in recent years. One study in Florida
demonstrated that pesticides are definitely the most significant caus-
ative agents in accidental death by poisoning of children.1 The
danger of dermal absorption by way of direct application and gross
contact, through improper storage and disposal of containers, and
by way of occupational and environmental exposure has also been
made far more apparent as a result of other studies in this area.,
In addition, the beneficial effects of such a pesticide as 2,4-D,
for example, are matched only by its potential for harm. While rela-
tively harmless to narrow-leafed plants, 2,4-D does not discriminate
between valuable and harmful broad-leafed plants, and it will kill
many important commercial crops if applied to a field for which it
was not intended.3 In the dry atmosphere of the West and Southwest,
where 2,4-D decomposes very slowly, it has been shown to have
killed seedlings in soils as long as six to nine months after its ap-
plication.
4
Due to the hazards involved with the use of these chemicals,
a relatively new area of liability has arisen in recent years, a
liability extending to manufacturers and users of pesticides alike.
Liability is grounded upon statutory and common law principles.
This note, therefore, treats potential liability for the manufacture
and use of pesticides on the federal and state levels, and it also
projects possible future theories of liability.
PESTICIDES-DEFINED
As discussed in this note, "pesticides" refers to those chemicals
designated "economic poisons" by the Federal and North Dakota
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Acts. The Federal Act
(FIFRA) defines economic poisons as:
1. Rohrmann, The Law of Pesticidea, 17 J. PUB. I&w 351, 366 (1968).
2. Id. at 367.
3. Note, Crop Dusting, 6 STAN. L. REv. 69, 70 (1953).
4. Id. at 72.
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(1) any substance or mixture of substances intended for
preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any insects,
rodents, nematodes, fungi, weeds, and other forms of plant
or animal life or viruses, except viruses on or in living man
or other animals, which the Secretary (of Agriculture) shall
declare to be a pest, and
(2) any substance or mixture of substances intended for use
as a plant regulator, defoliant or desicant.
5
The North Dakota Act (NDIFRA) omits the second category from
its definition and requires only economic poisons used as insecticides
and fungicides to be registered, thereby excluding the entire area
of herbicides. The State Laboratories Department, however, requires
that herbicides as well as insecticides and fungicides be registered.6
In addition, the North Dakota Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
specifically excludes plant regulators from the. requirements of that
Act:
Nothing in subsection 20 ... shall be construed to apply
to any pesticide chemical, soil or plant nutrient, or other ag-
ricultural chemical solely because of its effect in aiding, re-
tarding, or otherwise affecting, directly or indirectly the
growth or other natural physiological process of produce of
the soil. .. . 7
Also omitted from regulation by the NDIFRA is the area of
nematocides, controllers, of nematodes-invertebrate, unsegmented
round worms with long, saclike bodies which inhabit the soil, water,
plants and plant parts.8
Both the Federal and North Dakota Acts include within their
definition of "economic poisons" the chemicals designated in their
titles. Insecticides are, defined as substances intended for preventing,.
destroying, repelling or mitigating any insects-primarily mosquitoes
and houseflies.9 Substances performing the same functions against
fungi and rodents are designated fungicides ° and rodenticides.",
Since no distinction will be made in the ensuing discussion, it
will be important to remember that the term "pesticide" includes
5. Fed. Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 135(a) (1964).
6. Letter from L. A. Koehler, State Laboratories Dept. to Robert E. Beck, March 12,
1970:
While they are not specifically named in the section of registration,
herbicides are included in the section on definition. I am sure that it is the
intent of this Act to regulate herbicides in the same manner other economic
poisons are regulated. Herbicides have been registered with this Department
since the law was adopted in 1947.
7. N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-02.1-01 (Supp. 1969).
8. Fed. Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1964).
9. 14. at § 135(c).
10. Id. at § 135(d).
11. 14. at § 186(e).
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a broader range of chemicals subject to regulation by the Federal
than by the State Act.
MANUFACTURER'S AND SELLER'S LIABILITY
A duty of care binds manufacturers and sellers of pesti-
cides. This duty includes a duty to warn of product-connected
dangers, a duty on the part of the manufacturer to subject
the compound to reasonable tests, and a duty on the part of
the seller to subject the product to reasonable inspection.12
The first and second duties are implied in the NDIFRA,18 the
FIFRA1' and the law of torts.1 5 "The third is a common law
duty imposed as a matter of law and practicality."1 6
A manufacturer can be held liable for any injury caused by a
breach of these duties either as a statutory violation or under common
law negligence principles. And even though a manufacturer comply
with the specific labeling requirements of the NDIFRA and the
FIFRA, such compliance may not be sufficient to free him from
liability. A 1965 case illustrates the scope of this duty. Two farm
laborers died after spreading parathion dust. The label on the dust
container warned:
CAUTION: May Be Fatal If Swallowed, Inhaled or Absorbed
Through Skin. Rapidly Absorbed Through Skin. Do not get in
eyes or on skin. Wear natural rubber gloves, protective cloth-
ing and goggles. In case of contact wash immediately with
soap and water. Wear a mask or respirator of a type passed
by the U. S. Department of Agriculture for parathion pro-
tection. Keep all unprotected persons out of operating areas
or vicinity where there may be danger of drift. Vacated areas
should not be re-entered until drifting insecticide and volatile
residues have dissipated. Do not contaminate feed and food-
stuffs. Wish hands, arms and face thoroughly with soap and
water before eating or smoking. Wash all contaminated cloth-
ing with soap and hot water before re-use.17
The Court held that the jury could have found that the manufac-
turer should have known that his product would be used by illiterate
laborers and should, therefore, have included a symbol-such as a
skull and crossbones- in addition to the label's written warning.1s
This decision is particularly applicable to those areas of North Dakota
in which migrant, non-English speaking workers are seasonally em-
ployed.
12. Rohrmann, oupra note 1, at 369.
13. N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-18-03 (1960).
14. Fed. Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 135a (1964).
15. See W. PROSSER, THE LAw or TORTS 649 (3d ed. 1964).
16. Rohrmann, supra note 1,, at 369-370.
17. Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402,, 403 (5th Cir. 1965).
18. Id. at 405.
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. . . the area of greatest activity is the possible liability
under a breach of warranty theory. There is considerable
authority to the effect that manufacturers and sellers of pesti-
cides are bound by the implied warranty of fitness for a par-
ticular purpose and the implied warranty of merchantabil-
ity.1.9
Both of these warranties are covered by the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC),20 which is the law in North Dakota.
Even before the passage of the UCC, however, North Dakota
cases were holding that where a buyer purchases farm machinery
or grain, these materials were covered by implied warranties of
fitness.21 With the incorporation of the Implied Warranties of Mer-
chantability and Fitness 22 into the North Dakota Century Code in
1966 within the UCC, these warranties simply assumed statutory
as well as common law authority. Moreover, such a manufacturer
or seller may also bind himself by express warranties, the breach
of which will give rise to liability for any resulting injury.
23
Traditionally, warranty liability could only be utilized by a pro-
spective plaintiff who could prove that he was injured, that the
injury was a result of negligence of the manufacturer, and that he
was in privity of contract with the manufacturer. "The area of
privity, however, is in a state of great transition. A few jurisdictions
have altered this requirement or wholly obliterated it .... "24 And,
in a suit of this sort, no formal prerequisites may be required
if, as a matter of law, the pesticide involved is considered inherently
dangerous.
2 5
Another somewhat less significant theory in the case of a person
injured by a defective pesticide is that of fraud and deceit.
Here again, if a plaintiff alleges fraud in the sale of
pesticide in an effort to recover for some injury he has suffer-
ed, he may be forced to prove that he was in privity of con-
tract with the manufacturer or seller. As with the warranty
theory, however, the doctrine of privity in relation to fraud is
also changing, although the inherent danger of the compound
has nothing to do with the decline of this doctrine in these
cases.
2 6
19. Rohrmann, supra note 1, at 369-370.
20. N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-01-01 (1960).
21. Deere & Webber Co. v. Mloch, 71 N.D. 649, 3 N.W.2d 471 (1942) ; MCeLane v. F. HEL
Peavey & Co., 72 N.D. 468, 8 N.W.2d 308 (1943).
22. N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-31, -32 (1960).
23. Express warranties are governed by U.C.C. § 2-313 and N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-30
(1960).
24. Rohrmann, supra note 1, at 370.
25. Id. at 870.




The civil and criminal sanctions of the North Dakota 27 and
Federal28 Food, Drug & Cosmetic Acts become operative if a food
introduced into intrastate or interstate commerce is adulterated.
An agricultural commodity is considered adulterated if it contains
any pesticide chemical, unless a regulation limiting the quantity is
in effect, and the use or intended use of such substance conforms
to the terms prescribed by the regulation.
29
The reference here is to the tolerance levels set by the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW). Tolerance levels are the
amount of pesticide residue allowed on agricultural commodities
since such amount is considered below the amount which causes
danger to man or animals.30 Certain pesticides, however, are allowed
no tolerance levels-that is, they are considered too dangerous
to be allowed a residue or are thought to leave no residue and
are therefore registered on a "zero tolerance" basis. One difficulty
with the zero-tolerance concept is that the capability of discovering
residues on commodities tested is dependent upon the sensitivity
of the testing device; since testing devices are constantly being
refined, pesticides originally thought to leave no residue, and there-
fore registered on a zero tolerance basis, have since been found
to leave a residue.31 The manufacturer's registration has been sub-
sequently revoked and the user's crop become subject to seizure.
8 2
Agricultural commodities shipped in interstate commerce are
subject to the provisions of the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic
Act and are subject to registration, testing, possible seizure and
subsequent penalties prescribed by the Act. "Under the existing
legislation, explicit provision is made for interagency action involving
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and HEW.
... In addition to this interagency agreement, the Federal Committee
on Pest Control was established in 1964 to coordinate all federal
activities in monitoring pesticide residues, guiding research pro-
grams and administering public information programs." s8 Under
27. N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-02.1 (Supp. 1969).
28. 21 U.S.C. § 331 (1964).
29 Persistent Pesticides, 6 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PRoB. 122, 132-133 (1970).
30. See No Residue and Zero Tolerance, 20 FOOD DRUG Cosm. L.3. 608 (1965).
31. Id.
32. Ward, A Dynamic Statute for Pesticides, U.S. DEFT. OF AGRICULTURE YEARBOOK,
271, 277 (1966):
Since "no-residue" was dependent on the sensitivity of the methods avail-
able, it became inevitable that improved chemical analytical methods would
create legal problems. This has indeed happened.
The stage had been set . . . for the part FIFRA and Its enforcement
was to play in the dramatic developments which started on November 9.
1959. That was the day the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare an-
nounced seizure of cranberries contaminated through misuse of aminotrazols.
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the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, the Secretary of HEW is delegated
the responsibility of enforcement of tolerance standards. If the resi-
due level is above the tolerance established by HEW, its Secretary
is authorized to stop the shipment of such commodities through
a court injunction4 or to have the commodity seized. 85 Any person
violating the provisions of the Act is guilty of a misdemeanor and
will, upon conviction, be subject to imprisonment for not more than
one year, or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both.86 But if another
violation is committed after a conviction of such person under the
Act has become final, he is subject to imprisonment for not more
than three years, or a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.87
Under the North Dakota Act, the State Laboratories Department
is authorized to test and seize agricultural commodities shipped
in intrastate commerce. 88 The standards adopted by the Department
are essentially those adopted by HEW.39  The penalties differ sig-
nificantly. The State Act prescribes a fine of not less than $25 and
not more than $100, or imprisonment in the county jail for not less
This chemical is a herbicide which was first used on nonfood areas to
control grassy weeds. It was then found to be effective in removing weeds
from cranberry bogs, and an application for its registration for that usage
was filed with the Agriculture Department.
Extensive toxicological work was required, and a petition for a tolerance
for arninotriazole on cranberries was presented at levels which would permit
use during the spring months. After careful consideration of the toxicological
facts, the petition was denied and the use on cranberries---in accordance
with the spring pattern of application-was not registered.
The company then carried out extensive tests using the material in the
fall within 10 days after the berries were picked. This use was shown not
to leave any residue on the succeeding crop--and to give good weed control.
With the concurrence of FDA this use was then registered.
Unfortunately, some cranberry growers applied the herbicide in the
spring and harvested contaminated berries. This type of misuse brought
about the "cranberry episode" of 1959.
83. E.g., Pers8itent Peati fdes, supra note 29, at 134, 186:
How well does this interagency structure work in practice? In the area
of preserving environmental quality, the results have not been encouraging.
The problem facing the FDA in trying to establish tolerances which take into
consideratalon the long-term effects of low doses of chemical residues on
humans seems to have been ignored and is not answerable from present re-
search. Numerous complaints of inefficincy on the part of the Agriculture
Research Service, charged with enforcement of the FIFRA, seem to be war-
ranted. According to the General Accounting Office, the Service has failed
to report a single violator for prosecution in 13 years. Frequent complaints
are made that the USDA has as its principle obligation protection of agricul-
tural interests, hence conflict of interest exists by merely having pesticide
regulation within its jurisdiction. The lack of an ecological focus and a firm
policy of ecological management, which was noted in 1964, seems all to ap-
parent today as well. Under the current statutory provisions, fish and wild-
life are thought to be protected. However, it is noteworthy that while the
USDA and HEW have explicit functions emanating from the FIFRA and the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, respectively, the Interior Department
serves only in an advisory capacity under the present interagency agreement.
34. Pure Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 334(a).
85. Id. at § 832.
86. Id. at § 333.
37. Id.
38. N.D. CzNT. Coc §§ 19-02-01, -03, -05 (Supp. 1969).
39. Letter from L. A. Koehler, State Laboratories Dept. to Robert E. Beck, Oct. 8,
1968: "I wish to advise you that we have not adopted tolerances for pesticide chemicals
and food additives at the state level. We acknowledge and accept Federal tolerances in
this area."
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than ten days nor more than thirty days, or both.40 But if another
violation is committed after a conviction under the Act has become
final, such person will be subject to a fine of not less than $100 nor
more than $500, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not
less than thirty days nor more than ninety days, or both. 1
Aerial Spraying
At a minimum, a high duty of care is imposed upon the spray
pilot. Due to the great variations in particle size, atmospheric forces,
and aerodynamic turbulence, when the spray is applied, the pilot's
ability to restrict its application to a given area is limited, and
drift to other lands not intended to be sprayed is often the result.
Aerial spraying has, therefore, been generally classified as an "ultra-
hazardous activity" .
4
North Dakota Supreme Court decisions indicate that the pilot
must at least have been negligent in some aspect of his spraying
activity in order for the applicator to incur liability.43 Whether the
pilot is spraying his own land or the land of, another, however, the
owner of the land sprayed will be liable for any injuries incurred
as a result of the spraying, since duties arising in connection with
such an ultrahazardous activity cannot be delegated to another.4 4
Therefore, the owner of the land as well as the spray pilot may
be held liable for damages arising as a result of negligent spraying.
In addition, both the owner and the pilot may alslo be held liable
for the non-negligent acts of the pilot under the theory of "strict
liability" (discussed below).
"At the state level control over the use of pesticides is accom-
plished generally by both registration or labeling 'laws' and by
means of use and application laws.' 45 Because of the varying needs
of different geographic regions, application laws are not uniform
throughout the country. They generally include, by regulation or
statute, licensing provisions and regulation of the use of pesticides.
North Dakota's licensing statute for spray pilots requires that
they obtain a license for each aircraft used in aerial spraying.46
Upon payment of a $15 license fee and compliance with the rules
and regulations prescribed by the State Aeronautics Commission,
the Commission will issue a license. The statute also provides that
any person violating the rules laid down by the Commission shall
40. N.D. CENr. CODE § 19-02.1-04 (Supp. 1969).
41. Id.
42. Rohrmann, supra note 1, at 375.
43. Burt v. Lake Region Flying Service, 54 N.W.2d 339 (N.D. 1952).
44. For the rules governing a principal's liability for the negligence of an Independent
contractor, see W. PROSSBE, THE LAW OF TORTS 480 (3d ed. 1964).
45. Persstent Pesticidea, supra note 29, at 139.
46. N.D. CENT. CODE § 2-05-18 (1960).
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be punished by a fine not exceeding $100 or by imprisonment for
not more than 30 days or both.4 7
The Aeronautics Commission requires that a private pilot submit
evidence of having flown 500 solo hours, of which at least 250 shall
have been in the type of aircraft in which his spray equipment is
contained. He must have flown a minimum of five hours simulated
dual spraying time under the direction of a qualified spray pilot
with a commercial Federal Aeronautics Administration license, who
has at least 100 logged hours of spraying time. 48 The Commission's
regulations also encompass spraying procedures, supervisory re-
quirements" and post-spray procedures."
In addition to penalties prescribed by the North Dakota Century
Code, the regulations of the Aeronautics Commission reserve the
right to either revoke existing licenses or refuse to issue them
in the first instance where violations of any of its regulations have
occurred. 52 In North Dakota, where negligence must be proven in
most instances (exception to be noted), failure to comply with these
regulations may be considered negligence per se.
Other statutes also apply to claims for damages to persons or
property through airplane use. One North Dakota Century Code
provision concerning damages due to airplane use explicitly refers
to "absolute liability" and defines it: ". . . whether the owner was
negligent or not." 5 Under this concept, even if the pilot and the
landowner have fulfilled all the requirements of the Aeronautics
Commission and the Code provisions, as well as complied with the
directions for use specified on the label, they may still be held
liable for damages-the pilot directly and the landowner indirectly
since liability for ultra-hazardous activities cannot be delegated.
With the increased -recognition of the need for environmental and
personal protection, this concept may soon be applied by the North
Dakota Supreme Court as well as by the North Dakota District
Courts, at least one of which has already applied it.
54
However, another Code provision 55 tends to mitigate damages
to sprayers and applicators of pesticides. According to the provision,
no action may be commenced against the landowner or pilot unless
the claimant has filed a verified report of the loss with the Aeronautics
47. Id.
48. RULES AND REGULATIONS OF TE NORTHE DAKOTA AERONAUTICS COMMISSION Para.
II(a) (1), (1970).
49. Id. at Para. IV(a) and (b).
50. Id. at Parm. TV(c) and (d).
51. Id. at Para. V(a).
52. Id. at Para. XII.
53. N.D. CENT. CODE § 2-03-05 (1960).
54. Special Instructions to the Jury by Hon. Clifford Jansonius in Lewis Jochim, Al-
bert Meyer, Louis Schumacher v. Agrichemical Aerial Applicators, Inc., No. 20324, 20823,
and 20325, Dist. Ct. 4th Jud. Dist. (Oct. 30, 1969) (from the files of Rausch & Chap-
man, Attorneys for Plaintiffs).
55. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-40 (1960).
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Commission, together with proof of service upon the sprayer within
60 days of the date the claimant knew of the loss. If the damage
is alleged to have been done to growing crops, the report must
be filed prior to harvesting of 50% of the crop.
No cases have yet arisen in North Dakota regarding other methods
of application. However, since the dangers inherent in aerial spray-
ing are not present to the same degree in other methods of appli-
cation, it is doubtful that the concept of strict liability would be
applicable to them. Cases which are most likely to arise regarding
other methods of application will be treated in the following section.
Liability to Employees
Under North Dakota law, any employer is required to have
Workmen's Compensation Insurance when employing in a hazardous
activity.56 Though agricultural employers have been excluded from
this requirement, 7 if a farmer does have the insurance and has
contributed to the Workmen's Compensation Fund, he is relieved of
all liability by the North Dakota Code: "[The employee] shall
have no right of action against such contributing employer . . .for
damages for personal injuries, but shall look solely to the fund for
compensation. ' 58 Workmen's Compensation Insurance covers the em-
ployee for injuries due to the employer's negligence, due to accidents,
or due to the negligence of the employee himself.
5 9
If the employee can prove negligence, the North Dakota Century
Code requires that the employer compensate him in the event that
the employer does not have Workmen's Compensation Insurance."
This provision has been held to cover gratuitous employees as well
as those working for compensation, but there must be evidence that
the employer requested the help of the plaintiff.61
Another Code provision, however, modifies the employer's lia-
bility in that the employer is not required to compensate his em-
ployees for losses suffered by the latter in consequence of the "ordi-
nary risks" of the business in which he is employed, nor in conse-
quence "of the negligence of another person employed by the same
employer in the same general business, unless the employer has
neglected to use ordinary care in the selection of the culpable em-
ployee."6
2
This provision simply restates the common law in these areas.
Under the common law assumption of risk defense, for example, the
56. N.D. CENT. CODE at § 65-01-05 (1960).
57. N.D. CmNT. CODE at § 65-01-02 (Supp. 1969).
58. N.D. CENT. CODE at 65-01-08 (1960).
59. N.D. CENT. CODE at § 65-01-01 (1960).
60. N.D. CENT. CODE at 3 34-02-03 (1960).
61. Olson v. Kern Temple, Ancient Arabic Order of the Mystic Shrine, 77 N.D. 365. 43
N.W.2d 385 (1950); Jacobs v. Bever, 55 N.W.2d 512 (N.D. 1952).
62. N.D. CENT. CODA § 34-02-02 (1960).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
employer is not liable to his employees for damages resulting from
the ordinary risks of the business in which he is employed.68 The
Code provision also restates the common law defense of "fellow
servant" as well as the correlative common law duty of providing
suitable fellow servants. Yet another common law defense restated
by the Code is that of "contributory negligence."" One District
Court in North Dakota, however, has held "comparative negligence"
to be the rule in this State.6 5 None of these common law or statutory
defenses are available to any employer covered by Workmen's Com-
pensation Insurance."
6
The employer is bound by other common law duties as well. He
has the obligation of providing a safe place in which to work,
safe equipment with which to work, adequate warning and instruction
of any possible dangers connected with the work , which the employer
knew or should have known of, and promulgating rules for the con-
duct of his employees in order to make the work as safe as possible67
A breach of these common law duties with regard to pesticide use
is also evidence of negligence.
The Exterminator
Another area involving pesticide liability deals directly with the
question of an exterminator's responsibility for personal injury and
death. While no such cases have yet arisen in North Dakota, most
cases in other jurisdictions hold that the liability of one in this
type of business depends upon a showing of negligence,6 8 but several
have held, because of the inherent dangers of such operations, the
applicator is strictly liable.69 However, both the owner of the prop-
erty and the exterminator may be liable for failure to warn a
tenant or other person who has a right to be on the property
of the use of such pesticides. "Exterminators are required in some
jurisdictions by statute or common law to know the nature and
effect of the pesticides they use. A showing of the lack of such
knowledge coupled with a resultant injury may be sufficient to
constitute negligence and justify recovery for the plaintiff." 0
POSSIBLE THEORIES OF LIABILITY
Since the area of pesticide use and liability is a relatively unex-
63. W. PROSSEe, THE LAW OF TORTS 550 (3d ed. 1964).
64. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-06 (1960).
65. Krise v. Gillund, No. 11144, Dist. Ct. 5th Jud. Dist. (N.D. July 29, 1969).
This writer agrees strongly with the Hon. Eugene A. Burdick's reading of the
phrase "except so far as" of § 9-10-06 of the North Dakota Centry Code as lending itself
readily to a comparative negligence interpretation, an Interpretation which is certainly
more equitable.
66. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-01 (1960).
67. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 546-49 (3d ed. 1964).
68. Rohrmann, aupra note 1. at 376.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 377.
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plored field, and because cases are sparse, various incipient liability
comcepts are certain to gain wider acceptance in prosecutions for
pesticide use. One such concept dates back in Anglo-American juris-
prudence at least to the year 1200; the second is as new as pesticides;
and the third lies somewhere in between.
Nuisance
At times the risk of pesticide use certainly outweighs its utility
either to the defendant or the community. Under the concept of
nuisance, a complainant so argues and calls for prohibition of pesti-
cide use by court order.7 1
The Court would then undertake a balancing process con-
sidering such factors as the character and extent of the
harm, the social value of the respective uses, the suitability
of the uses or conduct in relation to the surroundings, the
burden to avoid damage and perhaps the defendant's motive
for his conduct.
7 2
One need only refer to Ohio '8 and California74 in order to see that
such decisions have already been made by statute or administrators.
Legal Consideration of the Environment
Legal protection of the environment from large-scale
presticide applications has been attempted by court actions
of the Environmental Defense Fund. EDF is a nonprofit,
public-benefit corporation formed by a group of scientists
who contend that courts of equity represent the best hope
for acation to protect the environment where legislative and
administrative procedures have failed.
Headquartered in New York, EDF proposes to effect a
change in national policy regarding pesticide use through
legal actions brought on broad ecological grounds-asserting
the fundamental, constitutional rights of all the people to an
environment undiminished in quality.7 5
In 1967, legal action brought by EDF was instrumental in stopping
the use of DDT in several Michigan municipalities, and in 1968, 47
more Michigan municipalities were added to the EDF action. 6
Results of earlier EDF actions, and a similar case in-
volving use of DDT by the Suffolk County Mosquito Control
Commission in New York, have encouraged EDF plans for
legal action at the highest level in the federal courts to pre-
71. Beck, Pesticides and the Law, 37 N.DA,.Q. 49, 63 (Winter 1969).
72. Id.
73. 03iO REv. COD ANN. § 921.06-07 (Baldwin 1964).
74. CALIF. REV. COD tit. Agriculture §§ 14001, 14031, 14061, 14091 (1965).
75. 8. BLOOM AND S. DEGOIK, PESTICIDES AND POLLUTION 59 (1969).
76. Id.
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vent continued degradation of environmental quality by cer-
tain chlorinated hydrocarbons.7
Trespass
In a 1959 landmark decision, the Supreme Court of Oregon heldT
the Reynolds Metal Company liable in trespass when fluoride com-
pounds in the form of gases and particulates drifted from its plant
chimney and settled on the plaintiff's land.7 9 The plaintiff had been
awarded $71,500 for loss of the use of his land and $20,000 for
deterioration to his land. In a decision upholding the lower court's
award to the defendant, the Court illustrated the basic impediment
to the use of trespass as yet another basis of liability for the
use of pesticides and overcame the impediment by reasoning which
may become persuasive: 
8 0
The view recognizing a trespassory invasion where there
is no "thing" which can be seen with the naked eye undoubt-
edly runs counter to the definition of trespass expressed in
some quarters .... It is quite possible that in an earlier day
when science had not yet peered into the molecular and
atomic world of small particles, the courts could not fit an
invasion through unseen physical instrumentalities into the
requirement that a trespass can result only from a direct in-
vasion. But in this atomic age even the uneducated know the
great and awful force contained in the atom and what it can
do a man's property if it is released. In fact, the now fa-
mous equation E=mc2 has taught us that mass and energy
are equivalents and that our concept of "things" must be re-
framed.81
CONCLUSION
Various failings on the federal level in the area of pesticide
legislation and enforcement have already been noted. 2 They are,
however, not limited to that level, as this writer learned during the
course of his research.
Though some may look optimistically at the fact that the State
Laboratories Department in North Dakota has been able to settle
all cases of pesticide contamination outside of court, this writer,
tending to be more cynical about such things, attributes this to
inadequate staffing and enforcement capabilities. After all, the De-
partment is delegated the responsibilities given to a number of
federal agencies; yet it operates with a total of 38 employees, in-
77. Id. at 60.
78. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790 (Ore. 1959).
79. Id. at 797.
80. Beck, aupra note 69, at 61-62.
81. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d at 793-794.
82. see aupra note 29.
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cluding a janitor and four stenographers. And it has only one part-
time attorney. 83 Just what would the Department be able to do if
a number of cases were not settled out of court?
Inadequate staffing is not the only drawback to enforcement of
pesticide legislation. During a telephone conversation with a member
of the State Aeronautics Commission concerning the applications of
strict liability to aerial sprayers by North Dakota District Courts,
that member remarked that the Commission was trying to fight
such application of the concept but was having difficulties. If one
considers, in the light of extensive evidence produced in recent
years against pesticides, that strict liability would be a boon to the
public, the remark by a member of a purportedly public Commission
was revelatory of a lack of public sentiment. Conflict of interests?"
But enforcement is no better than the legislation behind it, and
legislation, or repeal of it, is necessary in North Dakota as well.
The statute 5 limiting sprayers' liability by imposing a sixty-day
limit and requiring a verified report to the Aeronautics Commission
is rather inconsistent with the need for maximum rather than mini-
mal controls in the pesticide use area. The large dichotomy between
penalties imposed on the federal and state levels8 6 as well as the
dichotomy between pesticides covered by federal and state acts
is further evidence of a need for the re-evaluation of state legislation
in this area.
This writer recommends, instead, the swift adoption of a state
policy designed to produce and maintain a high level of environmental
quality, a policy implemented by legislation providing adequate staff-
ing for agencies delegated the task of maintaining that quality; a
policy implemented by removal of conflict of interest from such
agencies; a policy implemented by removing limitations to liability
of manufacturers and users of pesticides.
This writer also urges the lawyers and courts of this state to
utilize existing concepts-such as the strict liability already provided
by statute8 7-and to forge new concepts suitable for waging all-out
war upon environmental polluters. Other theories cited in this note
are intended as suggestions, possibilities, not to be an exhaustive
list. As a beginning, the courts ought to apply the theory of strict
liability to at least all cases of airplane pesticide spray; they
ought also to foresake the privity requirement where injuries have
been sustained through manufacturers' negligence; and, in case of
83. State Laboratories Dept. of N.D., Biennial Report [1966-1968] at 3-4.
84. See supra note 29.
85. N.D. CENT. CoDE § 28-01-40 (1960).
86. See supra p. 340.
87. N.D. CENT. CODE § 2-03-05 (1960).
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legislative default,8 the courts ought to adopt comparative negligence
as the most equitable remedy in the case of those injured by
pesticide use."°
RicHAYW J. GRoss
88. Telephone conversation with the Hon. Eugene A. Burdick, Nov. 10, 1970:
If the North Dakota Supreme Court In its decision on the case now before It
on appeal (see, supra note 63) does not adopt the comparative negligence
concept as the rule In this state, legislation will be presented to effect such
a rule.
89. Bee eupra note 65.
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